Open-ended real estate funds under pressure: why 2027 could bring forced sales
Open-ended real estate funds under pressure: why 2027 could bring forced sales and what that means for refinancing.
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Anyone who receives a refusal in 2026, or is suddenly confronted with a much lower loan-to-value, looks for the fault in themselves first: in the calculation, the location, the pre-sales. In most cases it lies elsewhere. The barometer of commercial real estate financiers fell in the second quarter of 2026 from minus 9.74 to minus 25.97 points; a value of this magnitude signals a sharply reduced willingness to finance 12.
Almost half of the respondents, 46.15 percent, report worsened financing conditions compared with the previous quarter. Just under a quarter, 23.08 percent, report declining new business; in the first quarter of 2026 this figure was still zero percent 23. This is not a creeping trend but a break within a single quarter.
Between 2016 and 2023, loans were concluded on terms and valuations that no longer exist today. These loans are maturing, and the follow-on financing is smaller than the old one. The difference is the refinancing gap.
In Germany it reaches its peak in 2026: more than €40 billion of refinancing volume against an estimated financing gap of around €6.3 billion 46. For the German commercial investment market as a whole, the gap adds up to about €20 billion between 2024 and 2028 4.
In a European comparison Germany is ahead, but on the wrong side: Germany and France, at 19 and 18 percent respectively, have the highest share of affected loans among all loans granted between 2016 and 2023 5. Office and retail properties are affected above all; for residential and logistics the deficit is much smaller 5.
On 1 January 2025 the CRR III came into force, the European implementation of the reform package known as Basel IV 79. For developers, one change is decisive: the separate exposure class ADC, Acquisition, Development and Construction.
This covers financing of land purchase, site preparation and construction of residential or commercial property. As a rule it carries a risk weight of 150 percent 78. The EBA has clarified the conditions under which a reduced weight of 100 percent is possible for residential property under Article 126a para. 2 CRR III 7.
Important for the negotiation: the rule has become more systematic, not necessarily stricter, as development projects were mostly weighted at 150 percent before as well. What is new is that room for interpretation is shrinking and the exceptions are clearly defined 8. Anyone who meets the conditions of Article 126a para. 2 should put that forward actively; anyone who does not is negotiating against a fixed calculation parameter.
The second lever works at the large institutions that use internal models. The output floor limits how far model-based capital requirements may fall below the standardised approach. It started at 50 percent in 2025 and rises over a five-year transition period; the target value of 72.5 percent applies only from 2030 10.
Banks are steering new business much more selectively and at the same time are dealing more intensively with problem loans in their portfolios 2. In practice this shows up in four movements that almost always occur together.
What banks no longer cover does not disappear; it changes provider. Debt funds, whole loan structures and mezzanine are gaining importance without fully replacing the banks 11. The loan-to-value of a whole loan is generally higher than that of a bank financing, which narrows the financing gap for the borrower 11.
| Situation | Suitable route | Speed | Price, honestly |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bank finances, but 10 to 15 points less LTC | Mezzanine as a subordinated supplement | medium | considerably more expensive than the senior, but only on the gap |
| Bank withdraws entirely, project is ready to build | Whole loan from a single source | medium | single rate, higher than bank plus mezzanine blended |
| Acquisition window is running, end financing open | Bridge financing | fast | most expensive per month, justifiable only with a clear exit |
| Follow-on financing expires in 12 months | negotiate early, consider restructuring | slow | time is the price here, not the interest rate |
| Equity ratio structurally insufficient | Joint venture or genuine equity | slow | most expensive variant, but with no interest burden |
The article What mezzanine capital costs puts realistic costs in context; the distinction between acquisition financing and bridge financing is set out in Acquisition and bridge financing.
The assumptions are stated openly: total investment costs of €20 million, the bank lowers loan-to-cost from 80 to 70 percent, construction period 24 months.
The calculation does not always work out in favour of the subordinated capital. It always works out against it when the project margin does not carry the additional cost, and that is exactly the point at which a project must be reviewed rather than placed. How the gap can be closed on the numbers is shown in Closing the equity gap.
The right question is therefore not: when will the bank loosen up again? It is: which capital structure does my project carry under conditions that, on schedule, tighten rather than ease until 2030?
We first review the calculation, ranking, collateral and exit, and only then raise the capital. What does not hold up, we do not place. The mandate is fee-based; there is no free upfront work.
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